In the July 2011 issue of the Communications of the ACM you will find on page 5 a section entitled "Solving the Unsolvable", written by the editor in chief, Moshe Y. Vardi. In his words:
In 1936–1937, Alonzo Church, an American logician, and Alan Turing, a British logician, proved independently that the Decision Problem for first-order logic is unsolvable; there is no algorithm that checks the validity of logical formulas. The Church-Turing Theorem can be viewed as the birth of theoretical computer science. To prove the theorem, Church and Turing introduced computational models, recursive functions, and Turing machines, respectively, and proved that the Halting Problem—checking whether a given recursive function or Turing machine yields an output on a given input—is unsolvable.
The previous passage is inaccurate in several respects. First, it is perhaps more appropriate to say that Alan Turing was a mathematician, not a logician. Second, even if Turing proved the Decision Problem independently of Church, he certainly did this after Church (more about this later). Third, it was primarily due to the work of Gödel and others (e.g. Herbrand) that the definition of a recursive (i.e. computable) function was introduced, not (solely) due to Church. And, it was not Turing who introduced what we today call a "Turing machine". Turing introduced his automatic machines which do not contain an input nor an output as is the case with the later devised "Turing machines". Turing's automatic machines were intended to compute forever; i.e. to compute a real number with ever increasing accuracy. In later years, Kleene and Davis recast the concept of Turing's automatic machine into that of a "Turing machine". Likewise, it was Davis (not Turing) who, during the 1950s, defined the Halting Problem. So, strictly speaking, neither Church nor Turing proved the Halting Problem.
The claims made in the previous paragraph will be elaborated on in a forthcoming publication (in spring 2012). For now, it suffices to note how easy it is to forget or be ignorant of the actual developments that did take place in the past. Here we have the editor in chief of a reputable magazine being inaccurate in several respects in just one paragraph!
"So what?" you may ask. "Isn't Vardi's account accurate enough for his readership?" After all, both Church and Turing did prove theorems which come very close to what we would today call the unsolvability of the Halting Problem. So why be so picky about Vardi's words? The quick and cliché answer is that Vardi is glorifying the work of some at the expense of the work of others: conceptualizing the "Turing machine" and the "Halting Problem" took several years and was also due to the work of Kleene and Davis, not just Turing. Vardi's passage strengthens my skepticism about the forthcoming centenary celebration of Alan M. Turing (in the year 2012); it is not hard to find several similar passages, also written by leading researchers in computing. The historical answer is that Church and Turing were, during the mid-1930s, solving a problem in mathematical logic. They were not, as we now tend to believe, thinking about programming or halting computations. They did not in 1936 anticipate that their work would be of extreme value in e.g. programming language semantics or complexity theory. By seeking heroes, like Church and Turing, we are often, albeit unintentionally, disrespecting their true accomplishments! The pending and outstanding problem of the day was the Decision Problem, it had to do with the foundations of mathematics, not with the foundations of programming or computation (cf. recursive function theory).
Recently, I have received comments that Turing may not have solved the Decision Problem independently of Church. One such comment states:
It is very common to attribute the result to Turing, or to blithely claim that Church and Turing solved the problem independently and simultaneously. This is not the case. As the papers by Church (April 1936) and Turing (November 1936) show, Church published his result several months before Turing published his, and, more importantly, Turing himself acknowledges Church's priority in the matter and compares his work to Church's. Moreover, Turing was Church's student at the time, in Princeton, and cannot be assumed to have done his work independently.
I received the above comment with some skepticism because I have read Turing's biography, written by Andrew Hodges, in which it is clearly stated that Turing was not aware of Church's work while writing his now-famous 1936 paper "On Computable Numbers ...". Hodges has, in fact, delved into Turing's personal correspondence to backup this claim. Nevertheless, as illustrated by Vardi's passage, we, humans, have a tendency to glorify. Therefore, in light of the 2012 centenary celebration of Turing, it seems most appropriate if somebody other than Hodges would study the matter again. To what extent did Turing rely on Church's expertise when he was with him in Princeton? How did Turing's draft versions of his 1936 paper develop? Questions like these deserve further scrutiny.
Furthermore, Vardi's passage presented above is, due to its inaccuracies, of value to the history of science itself. The passage seems to suggest that Vardi did not thoroughly read Church's and Turing's papers even though Church and Turing are considered by him to be among the fathers of what we today call "theoretical computer science". As mentioned, Vardi is by no means exceptional in this case: many (if not most) researchers in computing have not read Church's and Turing's papers. In retrospect, this is no surprise, given that their papers solve a fundamental 1936 problem in mathematical logic, not computing. These papers are extremely hard to grasp for the modern-day computing professional. This observation, in turn, begs the following questions: Did Turing Award winners, like Dijkstra, ever read Turing's 1936 paper? To what extent were they inspired by Turing's work? Answers to such questions will be presented in a forthcoming publication, a fragment concerning Dijkstra is presented below.
By August 1971, Dijkstra had written Chapter 2 of his "A Short Introduction to the Art of Programming" (see EWD316, page 15). In that chapter, Dijkstra explicitly referred to Turing's work although he did not cite Turing's 1936 paper. In Dijkstra's words:
A proper algorithm is an algorithm which halts on all inputs. An improper algorithm is an algorithm which is not proper. [...]
The question of whether a text that looks like an algorithm is indeed a proper algorithm or not, is far from trivial. As a matter of fact Alan M. Turing has proved that there cannot exist an algorithm capable of inspecting any text and establishing whether it is a proper algorithm or not.
This passage shows that it has been formulated by a computer programmer, not by a logician who was intricately familiar with Turing's original research agenda. Again, Turing did not deal with halting computations. In 1936, Turing would have associated the word "proper" with exactly the opposite of what Dijkstra proposed. The observation just made merely serves to contrast two leading researchers, not to criticize nor to belittle.